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Introduction 
 
The working definition of accountability of the regional government draws on the broader 
definition, provided by Schmitter, accountability being ‘a relationship between two sets of 
actors, in which the former accepts to inform the other, explain or justify his or her action and 
submit to any pre-determined that the latter may impose (2004, 5) implies an interaction between 
it and population. It describes not only the obligation of that government for explanation and 
justification of their use of delegated power, but also implies that the population is capable, using 
certain instruments and under certain conditions, of holding it accountable. Governments are 
accountable if their electorate has sufficient powers and means of discerning the 
responsive/unaccountable performance and sanctioning or rewarding them accordingly, in other 
words, if the performance of politicians influences their chances of being re-elected. Electoral 
accountability is better achieved over relatively long time spans, containing at least one but 
ideally several electoral terms. Over this period we may observe whether ‘bad’ politicians are 
detected by the citizens and voted out of the office, while ‘good’ ones are re-elected. Such a 
pattern will suggest that this particular government is accountable via elections to its 
constituents. 
 
Elections are the tools designed for the population to hold government officials accountable, and 
the current project seeks to establish which elements of the electoral systems are essential in this 
task. There is, however, debate as to how effective different electoral systems are in promoting 
accountability, particularly in transition countries. To assess whether and how accountability 
mechanisms have worked in one specific context, the strategies involved and their consequences, 
I examine evidence from recent Russian regional politics, utilising empirical data obtained via 
survey of experts in regional politics (2004), and from other available sources. Results show that 
levels of accountability are not affected by differences in electoral systems (PR or majoritarian) 
per se, but by different categories of proportional representation and plurality elections, as well 
as the different types of parliamentary structures . Therefore, by extending the debate over the 
electoral systems to a fresh perspective, the research contributes to the better understanding of 
the regional governance, and provides useful guidelines for electoral designers.  
 
The Federal Law "On Basic Guarantees of Citizens' Electoral Rights”, enacted in 1994, 
established a loose legal framework for the regional electoral systems. Regional governments 
obtained the rights to choose the electoral systems (PR or majoritarian), select the size of the 
legislative assembly, the threshold level, the rules for the formation of the party list, the method 
of the distribution of the public mandates, and the choice between open and closed lists. As a 
result, the political map of Russian regions encompasses a wide variety of the electoral systems 
and parliamentary structures. The electoral reform law, enacted in 2003, stipulated that at least 
half of deputies must affiliate and run as candidates on federal party lists and nominally vote for 
the programs and policies of their parties. At the time of the completion of the research, out of 
eighty-nine regions, forty-eight are still facing a challenging task of transforming their electoral 
system from single member plurality to a mix of single member plurality and list PR. This policy 
paper targets decision-makers in those Russian regions who actively launched the process of re-
engineering their set of the rules for regional elections in order to assist them in developing a 
new regulatory framework that will enhance the democratic accountability of elected officials. 
The target group of the project consists of decision-makers in those regional governments that 
are already fully engaged in preparing regional legislation for the elections which are to be held 
in the twelve months following the publication of the project, namely Adygeya, Altai, Dagestan 
and Buryatia republics, Khabarovskii and Stavropolskii krais, Belgorodskaya, Ivanovskaya, 
Kostromskaya, Kurskaya, Lipetskaya, Nizhegorodskaya, Novosibirskaya, Samarskaya, 
Chelyabinskaya oblasts and the city of Moscow.  
 
 
Electoral accountability of the regional governments – theoretical expectations and 
empirical overview 
 
As noted above, accountability is a property of interaction between citizenry and government, 
and the outcome of this interaction is responsiveness and openness, or lack of it. The presence or 
absence of responsiveness and openness is thus a measure of how accountable the government is 
(Ferejohn 1999: 131). Bearing this in mind, I measured the openness of governments by 
conducting a survey of experts in regions. The purpose of the survey was to find the answer to 
the core question of the project: Is there a causal relationship between electoral system and 
political accountability, and if yes, which electoral system induces greater accountability of the 
regional governments? 
 
Dominant political theories point out that the plurality rule is more inductive for vertical 
accountability (Powell, 1982, Blais and Dion, 1990, Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi, 2001), since a 
plurality system tends to produce a one-party majority government. One of the merits of one-
party government is its greater decisiveness, and the unambiguous effects of the decisions it 
makes on the fate of the party in power. This type of government holds its responsibility for 
policy decisions primarily to the electorate: if the party loses the support of the voter, it loses 
office as an outcome of the next elections. In coalition governments, in contrast, which are likely 
to be a result of the PR formula, ‘the fate of the party in a coalition has more to do with internal 
dynamic of that coalition than with the party’s electoral fortune’ (Blais, 1991, 242).  
 
Given the conditions of underdevelopment of parties in Russia, however, one cannot speak of 
legislative majorities being established on party bases. As Irvine puts it, ‘plurality systems make 
it easier for the voter to bring about a qualitative change in the way he is governed’ (1979, 25). 
However, the expectation that greater responsibility will be a consequence of plurality rule, and 
blurred responsibility a consequence of proportional representation, has been shown to be false. 
Moser (1999) provided evidence to show that under conditions of extreme party 
underdevelopment, proportional representation may in fact be more successful than the plurality 
system in constraining the number of parties and providing greater political stability and ‘clarity 
of responsibility’. The fragmented character and low institutionalisation of the Russian party 
system provide grounds for a hypothesis which runs counter to the aforementioned conventional 
wisdom: List PR can be more inductive for accountability of regional governments. 
 
The survey revealed that the regions varied significantly in their levels of accountability; 
however, the choice between the electoral systems had no discernable influence on accountable 
performance. The question can therefore be reformulated as follows: How much of 
accountability of regional governments in Russia is induced by elections, and how much by other 
institutions?  
 
Possible reasons for limited ability of elections to induce accountability in contemporary 
Russian regions 
 
In the contemporary literature on accountability, the concept of mechanisms of electoral 
accountability has indeed been described as constrained by several limitations:  
 
1. There is informational asymmetry, in that voters generally have a serious informational 
disadvantage in comparison to politicians. 
2. Elections are too crude an instrument to hold governments accountable: voters have only 
one blunt act (re-elect or do not re-elect) to express their attitude to the whole range of 
policies; this gives the government an opportunity to avoid responsibility by grouping 
unpopular with popular policy choices. 
3. Incentives to be re-elected are not always present due to limitations on re-eligibility. 
4. Voter’s ability to assign the responsibility for distinct acts of the government is limited, 
as it is difficult to figure out which branch/party/individual politician is chargeable for an 
erroneous or unpopular decision. Accountability becomes obscured especially in the case 
of coalition government and presidential systems. According to Powell (2000), electoral 
institutions that induce majority governments are better accountability devices, due to 
increased ‘clarity of responsibility’. 
5. The costs of the monitoring and assessing governmental performance may be too high, 
and expertise to make informed judgements lacking. 
6. Prospective appraisal significantly offsets retrospective evaluation: except in cases of 
massive abuse of public office, voters are less interested in retrospectively 
punishing/rewarding past performance than in prospective selection of promising 
behaviour/candidates (Fearon, 1999). 
7. Voters, as shown by surveys, are only sporadically involved in politics, and are subject to 
political manipulation (Page and Shapiro 1992)  
8. In general, then, the ability of voters to observe and evaluate the actions of politicians and 
correctly interpret whether these are in the interest of public is severely limited. Thus it 
can be claimed, with Fearon, that ‘electoral accountability is not in principle necessary 
for elections to produce responsive public policy’ (1999: 59).  
 
 
Parliamentary structures and regulatory frameworks  
 
The results of statistical analysis show that the level of accountability is entirely unrelated to the 
electoral system used, and elections by themselves are unsatisfactory instruments to provide 
citizens with responsible and accountable governments. What then are the other devices to keep 
state power under control? The current literature on accountability incorporates the notion of 
horizontal accountability, or the ‘capacity of state institutions to check abuses by other public 
agencies and branches of government’ (Schedler 1999:3), which constrain and monitor each 
other. A particular feature of Russian regional politics is the widespread dominance of the 
executive branch in the decision-making process. Recent research reveals that the arbitrary and 
undemocratic action in the Russian hinterlands stems primarily from the regional executive 
branch (McFaul and Petrov 1998, Turovskii 2002, Gelman 2002). The concept of horizontal 
accountability is not restricted to intrastate relations (Schmitter, 1999: 59-62), but includes a 
system of institutions standing outside government, responsible for watching and checking the 
policy process in government.  
 
According to recent literature on delegation and accountability (Powell 2000, Strom 2003, 
Schedler and Diamond 1999) executive bureaucrats are in agency relations with the legislature. 
Legislative assembles also experience an informational disadvantage in observing executive 
actions, but unlike citizens, the legislature has some extra means of holding the executive 
accountable. Depending on the constitutional provisions, legislative assemblies have more 
sophisticated instruments of accountability to employ against the other branch. Sanctioning is not 
limited to election periods, as in the case when the principal is an electorate, but can be applied at 
any time after the contract is adopted. Not only is the legislature not constrained in time, it is also 
not left with a single stark choice between re-electing and throwing out of office. It can utilize an 
additional type of sanction along with dismissal, which is punishing while retaining the executive 
as an agent (Elster, 1999, 254). Punishment without dismissal gives the executive room to 
improve its performance. Moreover, in this case, even within one term, the accountability 
mechanism includes ‘incapacitation’, along with the ‘deterrence’ dimension, which deprive the 
executive of the possibility of avoiding accountability for unpopular or incompetent decisions by 
mixing them with worthy or popular ones.  
 
Bearing in mind that the primary concern of horizontal accountability in Russian governments 
ought to be focused, in words of Schmitter, on ‘keeping the executive in check’(1999:60), I 
analysed regional constitutions and charters of the forty-three regions included in the survey, 
looking for clauses that enable the legislative branch to oversee the activities of the executive. 
 
Among various articles of the regional charters and constitutions, those pertaining to legislative 
checks over the executive were detected mostly in the chapters devoted to the Legislative 
Assemblies, and sometimes to the executive branch as well. As a rule, all the charters include 
sections and articles on the principles of formation and organisational structure of the assembly, 
eligibility of the candidates as MPs, rights and obligations of deputies, rules of election and 
resignation of individual members and the assembly as a whole. The most informative section 
from the point of view of the interactions between the branches of the government proved to be 
the one pinpointing the authoritative powers of the legislature. The analysed documents show 
almost complete uniformity in outlining the range of legislative documents required for 
legislative approval. They includes the main law of the region, namely the constitution or the 
charter itself, the laws regulating the affairs pertaining to the jurisdiction of the region, and laws 
regulating the affairs of joint jurisdiction between the federal and regional government.  
 
The most variation was observed in the sections that specify the areas of the legislative 
lawmaking: firstly, the structure of the section varied. Though in most cases, the charter 
designers designated separately the areas regulated by law (zakon) and statute (postanovlenie), 
some did not. Some regions have areas where legislatures exercise legislative control, written in 
a separate Article, while most do not. Secondly, there was considerable diversity in the content 
and wording of the specific rights in the area of appointment powers of the legislature. While in 
all the constitutions and charters the powers of the assembly to appoint justices of the peace and 
judges of the Constitutional (Charter) courts, where they exist, and half of the central electoral 
commissions were stated uniformly, the rights to ratify the appointment of the Vice-governor, 
and a range of the key ministers in the government (second vices) were not affirmed 
unvaryingly.  
 
In some charters the right was worded in an assertive and straightforward way: the right to give 
permission for the appointment and resignation (дача согласия на назначение и 
освобождение); in others the wording was less affirmative: participate in consultations on 
formation of the cabinet (участвует в формировании путем консультаций), in yet others the 
right was not mentioned at all. The right to remove a governor and government through 
impeachment procedure was also far from being a uniform right of the legislature: while some 
mentioned the right to vote no-confidence only in the governor, others extend this right to the 
government as well. A further discrepancy between the charters was observed in the area of 
procedural regulations. While most of the documents in question were conscientious in outlining 
the rights of the legislature to override the governor’s veto, and specifying the conditions 
(usually a veto can be overridden by a two-thirds majority of the legislature), some fell short in 
this respect. 
 
The accountability of the executive branch is higher in regional parliaments that hold more 
institutionalised powers to keep the executive in check. Institutionalisation prevents the fusion of 
parliamentary majorities and the chief executive, which destroys conditions for accountability by 
imposing a severe informational problem upon citizens (Strom et al. 2003, King 1976) and leads 
to adoption of bad policies, since legislatures are ready to pass all proposals initiated by the 
executive. 
 
 
Accountability and legislative process in the regional assemblies 
 
In many regions legislative assemblies have committees with muddled boundaries and 
sometimes overlapping responsibilities, led by hostile partisan opponents, which provoked 
legislative conflict, thus leading to recurrent procedural breakdowns. It is sensible to assume that 
frequent and massive absence of MPs while voting, and a chronically gridlocked assembly are 
both detrimental to the accountability of a government, while the presence of opposition, 
beneficial. By being a competitor, the opposition has greater incentives to monitor closely 
government performance and helps citizens to overcome information asymmetry (Manin, et al. 
1999). Additionally, the presence of viable opposition gives a government greater incentives to 
be more responsible in its behaviour.  
 
If we turn to the analysis of the accountability of the legislature, two factors appear to be salient 
for accountable performance: occurrences of no quorum, when deputies block passage of bills by 
leaving the floor or failing to turn up to sessions with a controversial agenda, are negatively 
influence accountability, while the greater role of the deputies in initiating legislation, and 
subsequently, a greater share of the bills initiated by them, positively influences it.  
 
The analysis reveals that there is a significant correlation between the occurrences of no-quorum 
and the frequency of anonymous voting. It shows that those legislatures that more often used 
anonymous voting were also those which suffer from frequent failure of the deputy corpus to 
gather the number of deputies necessary to vote on a bill. While the correlation may be spurious, 
one can find common grounds for both patterns: anonymous voting, as well as lack of any 
institutional constraints on deputies to ignore their duties to attend the sessions are indicators of 
lack of transparency in legislative affairs, which is detrimental to accountability. The second 
factor connected to the willingness of deputies to exploit the no-quorum mechanism is that there 
is no established forum for conflict resolution.  
 
The survey also shows that legislatures that have a greater share of the newcomers are less 
successful in keeping the executive branch in check than those assemblies which are stable in 
their composition. It is interesting to note that accountability of the legislature itself is negligibly 
influenced by turnover of deputies. Therefore it is plausible to suspect that the majority of 
newcomers have particular relations with the executive and governor, namely patron-client 
relations. The evidence supports this hypothesis. As noted by several analysts, the governor and 
his circle are increasingly becoming dominating actors in electoral process in the regions 
(Turovskii, Kynev). In contrast to the earlier practice where a governor supported only one party, 
or one ‘list’ of candidates, now governors can support several parties (as was the case in recent 
elections in Arkhangelsk oblast, Tula oblast, Khakassia), or governor’s candidates may even 
dominate all party lists, with the exception of the marginal parties, doomed to lose (as in 
Chitinskaya oblast, Tatarstan, Mordovia). These practices ensure the governor’s allies hold a 
parliamentary majority in the legislatures. This proposition is further supported by the outcome 
of the statistical analysis: the correlation coefficient between the turnover and the presence of the 
governor’s list has a positive sign. The fusion of the executive and legislative elites is detrimental 
for the accountability of government, as such legislatures are inclined to indiscriminately pass 
the bills initiated by a governor, and makes unpopular policies easy to pass.  
 
The results of the analysis demonstrated that the condition most likely to positively influence the 
level of accountability of both branches is a co-ordinated and balanced relationship between 
them. The second condition that proved favourable for accountability of both branches is when a 
governor did not officially or unofficially inform the electorate about his special support for a 
number of candidates to the legislative assembly. These two outcomes highlight the importance 
of the sustaining the balance of powers in the government, and diluting the presence of the pro-
governmental coalition in the legislature.  
 
The evidence from the survey and other sources shows that there is discernible variation in the 
accountability of regional governments, and that observers can distinguish between the openness 
of the different branches. The statistical analysis of the survey data revealed several potential 
institutional factors to which the executive and legislative branches demonstrate coherent and 
pronounced sensitivity. On the basis of these findings, the final section of this paper puts forward 
several policy proposals. However, it can be difficult to find straightforward policy proposals 
that ensure that both branches work in a co-operative way and the corpus of governor’s 
supporters does not dominate the parliament. It may prove impossible to find effective 
mechanisms that will dilute the concentration of pro-governmental allies in regional assemblies 
and shift the allegiance from resting predominantly on pro-governor’s regional elite to the other 
political organizations. It has been suggested that, for governors, PR elections are more difficult 
to manipulate (Moser, 2003, 39), and that the introduction of this system will create centres of 
power independent from the regional executives and reinforce the legislative check on the 
governors and administration, constraining arbitrary use of the administrative resources. 
However, the present research found that electoral rules did not influence accountability in any 
discernable way.  
 
Perhaps, one of the potential factors that distort the causal chain connecting elections to 
accountability lies in the degree of development of parties. In Western democracies, where 
institutionalization of parties occurs to a far greater degree than in the Russian case, different 
rules of elections produce different outcomes pertaining to the accountable performance of 
government. In the Russian regions, the correlation is confounded by the extreme 
underdevelopment of the party systems. It is plausible to infer that one of the possible causes for 
the low accountability of the governments dominated by executives may be the inability of the 
parties to withstand the competition with pro-governor parties in elections, or prevent the 
invasion of candidates backed by the governor. This hypothesis calls for more comprehensive 
analysis of the party systems in the regions, and investigation of how party systems help or 
hinder the electoral competition.  
 
 
Development of party systems and accountability 
 
The development of parties in many Russian regions happened in a distorted way, so that the 
usual criteria fail to indicate the strength or weakness of the individual parties in the regions. The 
floating, unstable character of regional party systems, the volatility of voter preferences, the 
development of parties from top down, and erratic party membership may have obstructed the 
causal chain between accountability and party development. This section will consider the 
development of party systems in federation and regions, and identify the potential drawbacks of 
the system that prevented the parties from playing a greater role in ensuring the accountability of 
regional governments. 
 
Many scholars have pointed out that the Russian partisan map is highly fragmented, parties 
poorly institutionalised, and party identification of the voters unstable. Many factors militated 
against the emergence of a stable party system: the intrinsic weakness of civil society, social 
fragmentation, the rise of alternative forms of interest representation, anti-party attitudes among 
the electorate, and electoral rules. Social atomisation as a consequence of communist rule 
prevented the rise of interest politics; the legacies of patrimonial communism undermined 
political parties by supporting personalistic and clientelistic networks; and the organisational 
characteristics of the democratic movement allowed its legacies to be viewed as 'anti-party' 
(Golosov, 2000). At the same time, the legacies of the perestroika-era political mobilisation have 
led to the emergence of the non-political entrepreneurship of the elite, and to a territorially 
diffuse mode of party formation (Gelman and Golosov, 1999).  
 
Federal parties had affiliations in a majority of regions, however only few of them can be 
described as strong independent organisations based on well-established societal cleavage 
structures. Significantly, continuing parties are very few, with only four uninterruptedly 
participating in all four electoral cycles, namely KPRF, APR, LDPR, and DPR. Legislators' and 
governors' party affiliations are unstable, and deputies frequently switch allegiance. This is the 
case with many legislators, both at federal and regional level. Not only do they change affiliation 
between factions and deputy groups, they sometimes switch from one party to another. Major 
and frequent individual re-alignments contribute to a situation where some legislatures end up 
with a faction structure entirely different from the one they started the term with. Needless to 
say, this personalised practice impedes the effective performance of the legislature, and damages 
the credibility of the regional assembly and the legitimacy of the party competition.  
 
Many regional parties can be portrayed as small, unstable personality cliques (Ostrow, 1999: 
231), with quite narrow goals, mostly focused on elections. The elaboration of developmental 
plans, the nomination of gubernatorial candidates, and participation in presidential elections are 
not on the political agenda of these parties. Even though such parties contested in more than 80% 
of regions, the share of the seats they won was small (13%, 22% and 14% in three successive 
electoral cycles). At regional and local level, high voter volatility and lack of party identification 
led to the strong personalisation of party politics and a pervasive practice of patron-client 
relations . Even for the KPRF, whose electorate is still sensitive to the party label in their voter 
choice, supporting a charismatic leader has become a decisive factor (Turovskii, 2003). To 
illustrate, in Sverdlovsk oblast', no matter how the parties were named, the major political 
struggle was waged between governor Rossell and the mayor of the capital city of the oblast', 
Chernetsky . A similar situation occurred in Krasnoyarsk, where the opposition between Uss and 
Lebed was framed into a struggle between the blocks established by the federal parties. The 
subordination of the regional branches to the federal centre was weak in these regions, and the 
electorate was aware which of these parties and blocks represented which regional elite groups, 
not the other way around. In other regions, parties straightforwardly use the names of their 
leaders in the title of electoral blocks: 'Blok Bykova', 'Za Lebedya', 'Blok Zubova'. Such parties, 
based on the strength and charismatic personality of one man, often lack serious programs, sound 
policy proposals, and clear political standpoints. Hence, personified parties lose the ability to 
represent important societal strata and fail to provide orientation or serve as an object of a 
political identification. 
 
According to Rose and Munro, the development of parties is a key predicament for the 
accountability of governments. They outline five requirements for the elections to be an 
instrument of accountability (2002, 101): 
1. Rather than acting individually, political actors form parties to appeal for votes in 
elections 
2. Parties nominate candidates nation-wide, rather than locally 
3. National party candidates, rather than the candidates from the local, regional parties or 
independents win the majority of seats 
4. Parties nominate candidates for all elected offices 
5. Parties persist from one election to another. 
 
These requirements were designed for the analysis of central governments, but they can be 
applied, with some alternations, to the regional level as well. One of the main differences will 
concern the second and third requirements. Stepping down one level, parties can be both 
national and regional as long as they are not local groups differing from one district to 
another. In the Russian case, neither regional parties nor federal branches of the nation-wide 
parties (except the KPRF) played a central role in regional elections. It was regional blocks 
of the federal and regional parties and political movements that actively participate in 
elections. These electoral blocks were active across the whole territory of a region; therefore 
they meet the second requirement and the first part of the third. However, the first 
requirement is seriously violated. Throughout the decade, individuals nominated themselves 
or were nominated directly by electorate (neposredstvenno izbiratelyami) far more often than 
parties. 
 
The scope of party activities in executive elections was low throughout the entire decade: out 
of 459 and 562 candidates who contested the second and third cycles of gubernatorial 
elections, only 74 and 46 of them respectively were partisan nominees (Golosov, 2003, 71). 
Moreover, party nominees tend to be less successful than independents: only 7% of them 
were successful, as compared to independents, who won in 13% of cases. Political parties 
play a considerably greater role in legislative than in executive elections: while party-
nominated candidates in gubernatorial elections ran only in 36.8% of regions and won only 
in 7%, partisan nominees for the legislative posts contested elections in 89% of regions and 
won seats in 67% of regional legislatures. (Golosov, 2003, 71-79). However, the percentage 
of party nominees in the total number of candidates is very low: from 0.5% in Buryatia to 
40% in Sverdlovskaya obl., with an average of 17% for all the regions . 
 
The fourth requirement necessitates that parties nominate candidates for all elected offices. 
As there are only two elected offices in the Russian regional politics, and in a majority of 
cases parties do nominate their candidates for legislative seats, we should look into the data 
for nominations for governors more closely. During the 1997-2000 regional executive 
elections, out of 766 candidates nominated for the office, 522 (68%) were nominated directly 
by electorate, 189 (25%) by themselves, and only 55 (7%) were party nominees. 
 
Parties did not nominate candidates for executive office at all in such regions as 
Kemerovskaya oblast and Komi in 1997, Buryatia, Ingushetia, in 1998, Belgorodskaya and 
Vologodskaya oblast, Primorskii krai in 1999, Altaiskii and Stavropolskii krai, 
Arkhangelskaya, Voronezhskaya, Ivanovskaya , Kaluzhskaya, Kirovskaya, Kostromskaya, 
Kurganskaya, Lipetskaya, Magadanskaya and Volgoradskaya oblast, Udmurtiya, Khakkasia, 
Marii El in 2000. All in all, out of 74 executive elections taking place in this period, in 42, 
parties and electoral blocks failed to nominate their candidates, while for the legislative 
elections for the same period only 10% of the regions failed to do so. Therefore, the fourth 
requirement can be seen not to hold for the majority of the Russian regions.  
 
The second part of the third criterion is also violated, since in the majority of the regions 
parties win a minority of seats. Even though parties contested in more than 80% of regions, 
the share of the seats they won was quite insignificant. Therefore, in a majority of Russian 
regions the elections fail to function as mechanisms of accountability because of the 
underdevelopment of parties.  
 
 
Parties in legislatures  
 
In the majority of regional legislatures, party participation in elections was lower than party 
representation after elections in the already working assemblies. This fact can be explained by 
several factors. Some regions demonstrated an astonishing increase in the partisanship of the 
regional legislatures: from zero to 100% in Magadan oblast, from zero to 67% in Kalmykia, or 
from 3% to 72% in Kabardino-Balkaria. Almost all regions where this pattern was observed 
belong to the category of autocratic or semi-autocratic regimes, and party participation can be 
explained by clan and corporatist interests, rather than indicating the strength of the party in the 
region or reflecting mass attitudes. This practice can be explained as a consequence of the fact 
that in Russia the definition of party in the legislature differs in the most cases from the ballot 
definition.  
 
In the observed regions, a different number of deputies are allowed to form a faction, or deputy 
group, the rights and obligations of the deputy groups also differ from one legislature to another. 
For accountability to work, it is necessary for MPs to be stable in their party affiliations, but in 
Russian regional parliaments this is rarely the case. In all forty-three regions, sanctions against 
deputies changing their affiliation were observed in no regional assembly regulations. Elected 
candidates have no constraints in changing their party affiliation throughout the period of their 
service in parliament. The volatility of their policy preferences is detrimental for accountability 
as voters will not be able to map deputies’ responsibility in decisions made by the parliament 
Moreover, not only do they change factions and deputy groups in accordance with their own 
changed political stance, but some use this as a bargaining chip in a pursuit of personal gains.  
 
What are the institutional conditions for this? In a majority of regional legislatures deputies can 
initiate and prepare their policy proposals and lobby them individually within the committees or 
directly on the plenary session. This feature intensifies the fragmentation and diffuse character of 
the assemblies, which in turn furthers particularistic interests (Chaisty, 2001). The weak 
commitment of the individual deputies to the faction they belong to, and to programmatic 
principles, create a fertile soil for informal activities such as corruption and clientelism. The 
closeness of the deputies to the decision-making centres when no legal transparent mechanism 
for lobbying interests exists makes them susceptible to corruption by powerful regional 
economic elites. As noted by Kiselev, several MPs in the Sverdlovsk regional Duma are 
notorious of their unscrupulousness, and party factions bid for their support in controversial bills 
by offering them higher rewards (interview, 2004). 
 
 
Electoral rules and party formation 
 
The effects of electoral rules on party formation in Russia have been analysed by several 
scholars (Moser, Golosov, Hutcheson, etc.). There seems to be general agreement that a mixed, 
unconnected system with the two halves of the Duma elected by different rules, and seats not 
compensated, splits elections into two separate campaigns. While the first favours strong federal 
parties with a widely spread electorate, the second promotes the emergence of small personified 
parties. These contradictory incentives produced a situation distinctive for Russia where two 
different sets of parties exist, those who are winners in single-member districts, and those who 
win predominantly on the party lists. As Moser (2001: 43) observes, with the exception of the 
KPRF, these two sets do not overlap, though more recently United Russia has been present in 
both sets too.  
 
The development of parties has been influenced by the first-past-the-post rule, used for the 
elections to the most of the regional legislatures, and by the two-round majority rule, used for the 
election of the president of the federation and the vast majority of regional chief executives, 
since candidates are discouraged from running under the banner of a party. To be able to cover as 
wide an electoral base as possible, candidates preferred not to affiliate themselves with any party, 
or even to hide any affiliation they may happen to have. This applies to all parties with the 
exception of KPRF.  
 
The particular configuration of electoral systems in individual regions emerged largely as a 
product of the bargaining of the elites at regional level, rather than the result of directives or 
pressures from the federal authorities (Golosov 2003: 211). Frequently in the period from 1993 
to 1996, incumbent governors used their influence over regional assemblies in drafting the 
regulations for elections to bias the outcome in their favour: they used their offices and public 
officials for unofficial electoral campaigning; and also often manipulated the time of elections, 
length of campaigns and electoral threshold to suit their interests and to the disadvantage of 
opposing candidates (Moses, 2003, 151).  
 
The electoral reform law, enacted in 2003, changed the electoral system from predominantly 
single member plurality, to a mix of single member plurality and list PR, stipulating that at least 
half of deputies must affiliate and run as candidates on federal party lists and nominally vote for 
the programs and policies of their parties. This reform is aimed at enhancing the independence of 
regional legislatures as a counter-balance against governors. By changing the incentives of 
politicians to run for seats in regional assemblies, it will potentially shift the entire dynamic of 
the executive-legislative relations (Moses, 2003). Federal government sought firstly to buttress 
the party system by forcing parties to diversify, and to centralise control over the regions. The 
latter was supposed to be done via the factions of United Russia (UR) in regional legislature. By 
the end of 2003, with only four regions using the mixed electoral system, seventy-eight regions 
have at least one deputy in their legislative corpus, and forty-seven have factions of the party of 
power. However the efforts of the Kremlin to subordinate the party system to the executive 
vertical via the promotion of UR as a party of power were undermined and in several regions 
United Russia failed to produce a sizable portion of legislative seats. This is due to both federal 
and regional factors. Not only are federal policies backed by UR leaders becoming unpopular, 
but also regional elites are refusing to support the party label, openly or secretly (Khakassia) 
undermining its credibility. Secondly, it was believed that a list PR system would give parties 
incentives to participate in regional elections and give party factions a more institutionalised role 
in the regional political system. Whether introduction of the proportional representation rule 
promote parties' penetration not only in space, to larger number of territories, but also in depth, 
enabling them to play a more active role in power politics, is discussed below.  
 
The introduction of the PR system is intended to promote competitiveness in the regional 
political arena. There is serious evidence to show that the introduction of the PR list system 
bolstered formal party activities, creating sham party branches existing only on paper, rather than 
society-based strengthening of the party system from the grass-roots level. The reform instigates 
the diffusion of the national parties, making one party brand include diverse political formations 
in different regions. In the words of Kynev, parties are converting themselves into merely 
technological mechanisms (2004).  
 
 
Policy Proposals 
 
a) The first device for parliaments that are to prone to conflict and deadlock is to establish 
recurrent 'roundtable' negotiations among leaders of political factions, involving also members of 
the government and representatives from public organisations, if necessary. In the absence of 
established fora for inter-committee co-ordination, this informal consultative mechanism can 
prevent highly contentious issues from paralysing the legislative process. It also can help the 
factions to hammer out face-saving compromises that have better chances afterwards of being 
passed in the full chamber. 
 
b) Since in many legislatures a high share of the bills is initiated by a governor, in order to avoid 
gridlocks, it is necessary to launch 'big-three' negotiations involving a governor, a vice-governor, 
and the chair of the parliament. This informal channel of negotiation will make it possible to find 
a compromise in highly divisive issues; I can give a governor a reliable estimate of the balance 
of power within an assembly, and revise bills accordingly. In addition to these ad hoc 
consultative fora, both governor and government are advised to establish permanent liaison 
offices in parliament. The aim of these institutions is to observe and manage day-to-day 
legislative relations. 
 
c) The legislatures should revise the regulatory framework connected to the procedural 
regulations: in relevant Articles of the charters, and in the internal documents of the assembly, 
there should be included a clause declaring the open character of the voting on the floor, and 
areas of anonymous voting should be clearly designated.  
 
d) Since legislative gridlock is often caused by frequent occurrence of the parties blocking the 
passage of bills, which hinders the accountable performance of both branches (the executive to a 
greater degree), legislatures are advised to form a leadership body composed of partisan factions 
and group leaders, i.e. an all-faction steering committee. The leadership body should have formal 
powers to set the legislative agenda, create committees, divide up leadership posts, and distribute 
deputies among the committees. 
 
e) Since frequent situations of no-quorum not only slow down the legislative process but makes 
the legislatures less accountable, deputies who fail to turn up on the sessions and vote for the 
bills certain amount of times should be subject to strict sanctions, up to denial of the mandate. 
 
f) Legislative powers to control oversee and check the executive branch, such as the right to 
ratify the appointment of vice-governor and key ministers, the right to remove the governor and 
the government through an impeachment procedure, and the right to override the governor’s veto 
power should be clearly stated in the regional charter or constitution. 
 
g) MPs should belong to the same party faction and vote according to the party programme, as 
the party in whose name they run the elections. The new edition of the “Law on Elections of the 
Deputies of the Duma of the Russian Federation” adopted in April 2005, denies deputy mandate 
for those who leave their party faction. This provision has to be adopted in the regional 
legislatures as well in order to curb frequent switches from one deputy faction to another 
 
h) The problem of independent deputies who still form the half of the legislatures in a bulk of the 
regions and do not owe their mandate to any party remains. Being directly connected to the 
electoral district, these deputies are bound by electoral promises, which are usually specific to 
that district. The scope of the policy decisions which lie outside these promises is far greater, and 
as a result legislative powers of independent parliamentary members are repeatedly used for 
particularistic purposes, indeed quite habitually they are used for corruption to influence 
legislation. Independent deputies should be required to join the party faction in the early stages 
of the service and be bound to the faction discipline in the same way as party list nominees, or 
form a separate chamber in the legislature with limited powers of lawmaking.  
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